



Oneofthe more intriguingdevelopments in
financial markets in recent years has been the
marked narrowing in the spread between the
yields oftaxable and nontaxable ("municipal")
long-term bonds. This spread has declined by as
much as two-thirds since the late 1970s. Recent
issues ofmunicipal bonds have sold with yields
that are as much as 90or 95 percent ofthe yields
on comparable, fully taxable bonds. In contrast to
these developments for long-term securities, the
relative yields on short-term taxable and short-
term municipal securities have remained rela-
tively stable, with the latter yielding between 50
and 60 percentoftheirtaxablecounterparts.
There are a numberofpossible explanations for
these patterns ofyield changes. This Letter
examines the various hypotheses and discusses
their implicationsforthe operation offinancial
markets.
Nontaxabledebt
The term "municipal bond" often is used generi-
callyto characterize all short- or long-term bonds
issued bya variety ofgovernmental bodies. Gen-
eral obligation bonds, forexample, are aclass of
taxable bonds issued typically by municipal,
countyorstate governmental bodies with the
authorityto obligategeneral tax revenues to retire
the bonds. Revenue bonds, on the other hand,
typically are issued by special districts oragen-
cies providing transit, public utility, irrigation,
housingorother services that receive income
from those services. As their name implies, rev-
enue bonds rely upon the flowofrevenues from
the specific services provided to retire out-
standing debt.
The decision toexemptthe coupon income from
a particularbond from taxation in essence is a
decision to subsidize the activityofthe issuing
level ofgovernment. Thus, the federal govern-
ment, forexample, is implicitly subsidizing gov-
ernments and agencies when the interestontheir
bond issues is not subjectto federal taxes. State
and local governments and agencies thus find
issuing tax-exempt bonds attractive because the
bonds allowthem to shiftfiscal burdens partially
to another level ofgovernmentwithoutenacting
speciallytailored legislation or programs.
Influences on municipal yields
Because the interest on municipal bonds is tax-
free, a major factor determining municipal bond
yields is the structure of incometax rates facing
bondholders. Ifa single marginal tax rate applied
to all taxpayers, otherwise identical taxable and
nontaxable bonds wouId sell to yield equivalent
after-tax returns, and these returns would be ,
identical for all taxpayers. For example, ifthetax
rate were universal at 50 percent, yields on muni-
cipal bonds would be roughly 50 percentofthe
yields available from similartaxable issues.
Under a progressive incometax system, the
determination·ofrelative yields is potentially rela-
ted in a more complex wayto the tax structure. If
very few municipal bonds are issued, the highest
marginal tax rate in the economywill determine
relative yields. However, ifthe class of investors
subjectto the highest marginal rate is unwilling
orunableto hold the entire outstanding stock of
municipal debt in its portfolio, the yield on muni-
cipal bonds (relativetotaxable bonds) must rise
to attract investors at lowermarginal tax rates. In
such a case, the relative yields oftaxable and~
tax-exempt securities would depend notonlyon
the level ofmarginal tax rates, butalso on the
outstanding supply ofmunicipal debtand the
progressiveness ofthe tax rate structure. Thus, the
relationship between yields ofotherwise identi-
cal taxable and tax-~xempt debtmay react
sharply to reductions in marginal tax rates and
changes in the quantityofnew municipal debt
issued.
Effects of recenttax reform
The majortax reforms initiated in 1981 altered
federal incometax rates significantly and thus
changed the relative desirabiIity oftax-exempt
and taxable bond income. Two tax changes in
particular may have contributed to the narrowing
ofthe yield spread.
First, marginal tax rates were reduced signifi-
cantly for all taxable income brackets. The
decrease, phased in overa period ofthree years,FRBSF
was 25 percentfor most brackets butwas almost
30 percentforthe highest bracket as the maxi-
mum marginal tax rate on investment income
was cutfrom 70 to 50 percent (i.e., a 20 percen-
tage pointdeclinefrom 70 percent is a 28.6
percentdecline). These changes alonewould
result in a 25 to 30 percent narrowingofthe
yield spread.
Second, marginal tax rates were indexed to infla-
tion. This indexation did very little forthe highest
incometaxpayers because they were already
subjectto the maximum marginal rate. However,
for taxpayers belowthe maximum rate, this
change reduced their anticipated marginal tax
rate position in future years.' By itself, this reduc-
tion also would tend to increase municipal bond
yields relative to the yields on similartaxable
issues. Its effects would add to those caused by
the basiccut in marginal tax rates and would be
most pronounced in the case of long-term (tech-
nically, long "duration") municipal bonds for
which anticipated changes in after-tax coupon
income are more important.
The recent trends in the relationship between
taxable and tax-exempt bond yields is consistent
with these hypothesized effects. The yields on
long-term municipal bonds, which were approx-
imately 66 percentofthe yields oftheir taxable
counterparts in mid-1979, had risen to as much
as 95 percentbythe end of 1982. On the basis of
the 25 percenttax cutalone, only an increase to
around 75 percentwould have been expected.
The relationship between the yields ofprime
grade short-term (one year) municipal securi-
ties and theirclose taxable counterparts, how-
ever, changed less dramatically. The tax-exempt
yields rose from 51 percentto 59 percentofthe
taxable yield in the same time period. This
change is roughly consistent with the 25 percent
reduction in the effective marginal tax rate alone.
(See chart.)
Supply effects
The discussion above suggests that increases in
the outstanding stock ofmunicipal securities also
wouId tend to narrowthe spread between taxable
and nontaxableyields. In the late 1970s and early
1980s, many state and local governments reacted
to the damagingeffects ofthe high interest rate
environmenton sectors such as housing and
local industrial development by issuing muni-
cipal bonds to those markets. The bonds allowed
state and local governments implicitlyto wrest
a subsidy from the federal government.
Mortgage revenue bonds were a particularly
widely used device to assist in providing below-
market mortgage funds to housingdevelopers
and homeowners.
Although the federal government-through the
Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act-placed limits
on thevolumeoftax-exemptmortgage revenue
bondsthatcould be issued, this type ofbond
nevertheless significantly added to the total
supplyofmunicipal bonds. (In California, for
example, mortgage revenue bonds in 1984 con-
stituted about25 percent ofall long-term state
and local debt issued annually, and represented a
large addition to traditional municipal borrow-
ing.) For taxpayers to hold additional municipal
bonds in their portfolio willingly, the yields on
those bonds had to rise to attract households in
lower marginal tax rates.
Changes in 1984
This explanation, based on the increased volume
ofmunicipal bonds, also is consistent with the
temporary increase in relative yield spreads that
occurred in early 1984 and the subsequent pre-
cipitous decline laterthe same year. The Mort-
gage Subsidy Bond Tax Actexpired in 1983 and
left state and local governments withoutauthority
to issue mortgage revenue bonds exemptfrom
federal income taxation. The Actwas reinstated
in June 1984, however, and theflowofnew
mortgage revenue bond issues abruptly returned
to earlier levels.
The Tax Actof 1984 also imposed caps on muni-
cipal bonds issued for "private activities" to take
effectJanuary 1, 1985. Many state and local
governments thatwanted to issue the affected
bonds -mostly industrial developmentbonds-
reacted by rushing todo so beforethe end of
1984. The result was a total ofnew municipal
debt issued in 1984 thatexceeded the 1983 level
by over 20 percent. This rush, therefore, also may
have contributed to the depression in yield
spreads observed atthe end of 1984.
Othercontributingfactors
The structure ofmarginal tax rates and the volume
ofnew municipal debt issues are notthe only
factors, ofcourse, thatdeterminethe relationship
between taxable and nontaxable yields. Some
observers have argued, forexample, that riskPercent
Source: Standard and Poor's, Salomon Brothers, Federal Reserve
Yields on Municipal Securities as
Percent of Yields on Taxable Securities
Implications for financial markets
The explanations offered here for the recent be-
haviorofmunicipal bond yields implies that, for
some reason, the taxpayers subjectto the highest
marginal tax rate are unwillingorunableto hold
the entire stock oftax-exempt securities. Their
reiuctance may be dueto theeffectiveness of
Internal Revenue Service provisions restricting
the abilityoftaxpayers to borrowto finance mun-
icipal bond purchases. (Ifthis were notthe case,
high tax rate households and corporations would
be able to increase their after-tax income by de-
ductingthe interest on borrowed funds while en-
joyingtax-exempt income from municipal bond
holdings.) Transactions costs also may make it
difficultfor investors to restructure their portfolios
quickly in response to changes in the relative
yieldsofvarious securities.





Whatever the explanation, our analysis suggests
thatthe long-term municipal bond marketwill
continueto be highly sensitive tochanges in tax
policy and the supplyofmunicipal securities.
Such behaviorcreates interesting challenges and












A final possible explanation forthe narrowing
spread between taxable and municipal securities
is thatthe marketplace anticipates further limita-
tions on the exemption ofmunicipal bond income
from taxation. (This would be the case, for
example, ifcertain features ofthe recent Treasury
tax reform proposals were implemented.) Such
an anticipation would cause the yields on long-
term municipal bonds to rise, but have littleeffect
on the yields ofshort-term municipal debt, a
result consistentwith the observed pattern ofrel-
ative yields. This explanation seems unlikely,
however, because the majorchanges in the rela-
tive yields oftaxable and nontaxable debt
occurred between 1980and 1982, beforesuch
tax reforms gained wide currency.
considerations also have affected relative yields.
It is, however, difficultto assess the effects of
financial difficulties encountered by some cities
and states in the 1970son the market's percep-
tion ofthe default risk ofmunicipal bonds.
Nevertheless, the mortgage bond insurance
industry-which insures bondholders against
loss resulting from default-hasgrown dramati-
cally since the mid-1970s, suggesting that in-
vestor concern over default risk may indeed be
more widespread.
Our analysis ofmunicipal bond yields, which
attempts to control for the default risk and impli-
cit call characteristics ofmunicipal bonds,
indicates thatthese factors are insufficientto
explain the observed patterns ofyield changes.
In addition, it is often pointed outthat many
issuers of municipal debtduring recent high
interest rate periods have included "call" fea-
tures that allowthem to call in the debtunder
prespecified conditions. These features are attrac-
tiveto the issuer because they allowthe option to
refinance the debtat lowercost should interest
rates faiL (Mortgage revenue bonds, by federal
law, also contain a mandatory three-year call if
the funds cannot be invested in the projects
intended for theiruse before thattime.) These
provisions, however, cause debtholders to de-
mand a higheryield to compensate them for the
risk passed ontothem bythe call provisions.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)











Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 188,161 959 13,089 7.4
Loans and Leases 1 6 170,058 983 15,191 9.8
Commercial and Industrial 52,286 288 5,999 12.9
Real estate 62,015 - 10 2,616 4.4
Loans to Individuals 32,471 - 8 5,694 21.3
Leases 5,289 13 263 5.2
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,037 1 - 1,229 - 10.0
OtherSecurities2 7,065 - 26 - 871 - 10.9
Total Deposits 193,727 1,491 9,924 5.4
Demand Deposits 44,964 928 2,789 6.6
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 29,697 620 991 3.4
OtherTransaction Balances4 13,227 768 1,028 8.4
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 135,536 - 205 6,107 4.7
MoneyMarketDeposit
Accounts-Total 43,433 45 3,424 8.5
Time Deposits in Amountsof
$100,000ormore 39,319 - 11 1,147 3.0
Other Liabilitiesfor Borrowed Money5 19,617 -1,832 799 4.2
Two Week Averages
of Daily FigureS
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(- )
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludestrading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accountS with telephonetransfers
5 Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percentchange